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T O AN increasing degree in recent years, state and local govern-
ment entities have been purchasing insurance to cover activities in
which they engage in which they enjoy a sovereign immunity from tort
liability. Why are government entities purchasing this insurance? Are
they authorized to do so? Is the insurance enforceable? To what
degree will this practice mitigate the harsh effects of the sovereign
immunity doctrine? Will it play an important role in bringing about
a general assumption of governmental liability? This article is directed
to a discussion of these questions in the light of the growing body of
decisional law in this area.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which exempts government
entities from liability for the torts of its agents, has been under critical
attack for more than three decades." On the federal level, this criti-
cism eventuated in the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946.2
On the state and local levels, however, progress has been slow, and the
immunity doctrine continues to demonstrate considerable vitality.
Initially, a distinction should be drawn between state and county
governments and their subentities on the one hand, and municipal
governments and their subentities on the other. In general, the broad
mantle of immunity covers all activities of state governments, 8 in-
*A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1956, Duke University. Assistant Professor of Law, Mercer
University.
' The classical reference in this field is Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34
YALE L.J. i, 129, 229 (1924) ; 36 id. I, 757, 1039 (1928).
2 6o Stat. 842 (x946), 28 U.S.C. § 2346 (1952). See WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT (1957). For a comparative treatment of the laws of other countries,
see STREET, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY 1-24 (1953); Blachly & Oatman, Approaches
to Governmental Liability in Tort: I Comparative Survey, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
181 (1942)5 Wade, Liability of the Central Government of the United Kingdom, 29
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1416 (954). .
. See Nutting, Legirlative Practice Regarding Tort Claims 4gainst the State, 4 Mo.
L. REV. 1 (1939), which surveys the constitutional, statutory, and judicial materials in
a generalized fashion; and Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363 ('.945), which briefly summarizes the highlights in each state.
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cluding such subentities as highway commissions, state universities, and
special subdivisions such as school and irrigation districts.4  Immunity
has usually also been held to extend to all activities of county govern-
ments, including, inter alia, their public schools, hospitals, and road
commissions.' While nearly every state has authorized some compen-
sation for at least limited classes of the tort victims of its agents, only a
few have undertaken to accomplish this systematically.6 In most states,
only piecemeal exceptions to the sovereign immunity doctrine have been
carved out by statute.'
The immunity enjoyed by municipal government entities is dif-
ferent, however, in that it has never been complete. It has existed for
only those activities which have been judicially labeled "governmental,"
as distinguished from "corporate," functions.8 Apparently, the purpose
has been to confine the protection afforded to only those activities which
See also Anderson, Claims Against the State, 7 VAND. L. REv. 234 (954) ; Eckert,
Another Decade of State Immunity to Suit, 2 ARK. L. REV. 375 (1948)i Herzog,
Liability of the State of New York for Governmental Functions, xo SYRACusE L. REv.
30 (1958) i Lloyd, Le Roi Est Mort, Vive le Roi, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 38 (1949) i
Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, z6 MINN. L. REV. 293,
480, 613, 700, 854 (1942) Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Government, 9 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 242 (i942) ; Van Alstyne,.Claims Against Public Entities: Chaos in
California, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 205 (1959); Waterman, One Hundred Years of a State's
Immunity from Suit, 14 TEXAs L. REV. 135 (1936).
'As to school districts, see Annot., 16o A.L.R. 53 (1946). See also Musselman,
Michigan Law on the Liability of School Districts for Torts, 2 U. DET. L. J. 63
(x933) ; Seitz, School District Responsibility for Negligent Supervision of Pupils, 25
MARQ. L. REV. x5 (941).
'See Kneir, The Legal Nature and Status of the American County, 14 MINN. L.
REv. 141 (930).
'New York has gone the farthest in the assumption of governmental liability. See
Herzog, supra note 3 5 Lloyd, supra note 3- California and Illinois have also progressed
farther in this regard than most other states.
" See Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 3-
'See, generally, Andeau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 40 Ky.
L.J. 131 (I952); Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and
Private Functions, 16 ORE. L. REv. 250 (937)5 Dodridge, The Distinction Between
Governmental and Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations, 23 MIcH. L. REv.
325 (x925); Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Action, 54 HARv. L. REV.
437 (94) Gardner, An Inquiry Into the Principles of Municipal Responsibility in
General Assumpsit and Tort, 7 VAND. L. REV. 753 (1955); Harno, Tort Immunity
of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (i92z) 5 Repko, American Legal Commen-
tary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 214
(1942) ; Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 91o (1936); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48
MICH. L. REV. 41 (1949); Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort
Liability, 28 VA. L. REV. 360 (1942) 5Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small Munici-
palities, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 363 (1942).
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have traditionally been considered "necessary" to government, and to
exclude from coverage those activities which are merely conveniently
carried on by government instead of by private enterprise. This nine-
teenth-century dichotomy was the judicial compromise struck between
complete protection of public funds and complete protection of indi-
viduals tortiously injured by government agents. Both the basis of the
distinction and its application, which has been difficult and artificial,
have widely been regarded as less than satisfactory.'
Perhaps the strongest argument for the abandonment of the sov-
ereign immunity doctrine is its inconsistency with the modern socio-
ethical notion that the risk of wrongful injury should not be borne by
the individual upon whom the misadventure fortuitously falls, but by
society as a whole. 10 Thus, it has been urged that compensation of
government tort victims should be viewed as a justifiable and expectable
cost of modern government. 1 ' A means of equitably distributing the
burden of the risk has been available to the federal and state govern-
ments and even to large cities in the form of taxation. And even though
smaller units of government, with their greatly limited independent
taxing power, have been unable to accommodate unlimited tort liability
by this means alone, the commercial development of liability insurance
has afforded them, too, a feasible device for spreading the burden of
these risks.'2
9 See Repko, -supra note 8; Seasongood, supra note 8.
"0 Another reason which is often urged for the abandonment of the sovereign im-
munity doctrine is the more extensive activity of government which results in a greater
likelihood of injuries to individuals. This, of course, is dearly true for the national
government; but there, immunity from tort liability has been restricted by statute. See
note z supra.
" Although this attack against sovereign immunity may be denounced as "wel-
farism," actually it is this reasoning that justifies the doctrine of respondeat superior as
applied to private corporations. The initial loss suffered by business employers is
shifted to the public as consumers by way of higher prices for goods and services. See
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. S83, 720
(x929); Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Deciions of Certain Types
of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1930). At this level of comparison, a better
case can probably bt made for the distribution of risk through taxation than through
the economic system, since taxation, being based on "progressive" principles, is more
equitable in its risk distribution.
"' Whether the funds of such governmental entities are appropriated by the legis-
lature or obtained through taxation, they are budgeted. Tort claims against a govern-
ment entity cannot be predicted in advance as to amounts, unless it is quite large. For
example, a school district may go ten years without incurring a sizable tort claim, and
then in one year, several serious school-bus accidents may eventuate in damages exceed-
ing one hundred thousand dollars. With insurance, the total cost can be.spread out;
the yearly premium can .be estimated and provided for in the budget.
[Vol. 1959: 588
Vuo. 1959: 56J LIliilY11 I.ViUK/NPIV5 591
As the proposal to shift losses arising from governmentally inflicted
torts from the injured individual to the public at large gains wider
acceptance, the immunity doctrine should suffer a corresponding restric-
tion. Unfortunately, however, this area has been characterized by
judicial obstructionism and legislative inertia.13 Courts have generally
evidenced little disposition to alter the doctrine of sovereign immunity
substantially; and as long as there are no organized pressure groups
protecting the interests of those injured by the tortious actions of gov-
ernment agents, little can be expected from state legislatures. Modi-
fication of the sovereign immunity doctrine will instead probably await
recognition by the insurance industry of the enlarged volume of busi-
ness that would ensue should the doctrine be vitiated and consequent
efforts on the part of the industry legislatively to hasten its decline and
eventual demise.
Although the existence of insurance as a feasible risk-distribution
device is the most persuasive reason for modifying the sovereign im-
munity doctrine and the insurance industry. the most likely spur of
future legislation, the fact that government entities have been pur-
chasing liability insurance, too, may play an important role to this end.
At least this is the opinion of some commentators :14
By far the most significant development in the state tort field in recent years
is the use of liability insurance both as a substitute for and a supplement to
governmental liability. . . .All indications are that governmental tort im-
munity is on the way out as a part of the American legal system, but the way
out is a slow and circuitous one .... Our law of torts preserves its ruggedly
individualized facade of formal language while at the same time it gradually
becomes in fact an adjunct of the law and practice of insurance, either private
or social. There is much evidence that this gradual transition is what is
beginning to happen, and will continue to happen, in the area of state and
local governmental liability in tort.
A variety of reasons may impel government officials to purchase
liability insurance to cover immune activities:
i. The purpose of the insurance may be to obtain the carrier's
services in defending suits against the government entity.
2. The law relating to the particular activity insured may be unclear
as to the matter of immunity. The purpose of the insurance, then, may
be to place the risk of an adverse judicial determination on the carrier;
and even where immunity presently dearly attaches, the carrier would
13 See note 54 infra.
x, Leflar & Kantrowitz, supra note 3, at 1413-15.
*IT-1 ...... nn"l
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bear the risk that the law might be modified during the term of the
contract.
3. The purpose of the insurance may be to protect members of the
public injured by government employees.
4. Finally, the purpose of the insurance may be to protect govern-
ment agents who remain personally liable for their torts.
To satisfy the first two suggested purposes, the carrier need assume
only a limited responsibility; to achieve the last two, however, assump-
tion of full liability would be necessary. The first purpose suggested
would, in the light of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, be of little
consequence were it not coupled with a duty to investigate claims. Al-
though unnecessary for a totally immune state entity, this service would
be useful to a municipal government entity. The second purpose sug-
gested, too, would generally be entertained only by a municipal govern-
ment entity engaging in activities only partially immune. Neither of
the two purposes suggested, however, would normally appear to be of
sufficient moment to warrant the purchase of insurance. But since
municipal government entities ordinarily purchase liability insurance
covering nonimmune activities, coverage for immune activities might
well also be included and the limited additional duties assumed by the
carrier for a small extra premium charge.' 5 The difficulty of discrimi-
nating the two types of activities may render this arrangement even
more practical and convenient."'
Where full liability of the carrier is sought, as would seem to be
the intent of state government entities purchasing insurance," the
" The fact that such arrangements have been made between carriers and municipal
government entities was established by the writer of the Note, 33 MINN. L. REv. 634
'(1949).
"The difculty is easily seen when a city wishes to insure a truck which is some-
times engaged in activities to which sovereign immunity attaches and is sometimes used
for nonimmune activities.
17A resort to logic has been necessary to establish the probable intentions of the
parties because their intentions have not been spelled out in the contract. Carriers have
used uniform liability policies which provide that their duty to pay is limited to the
extent of the liability imposed by law on the insured, which, if sovereign immunity
attaches, is nonexistent. Further, because the carrier, under most policies, has the ex-
clusive right to defend suits against the insured, its counsel is careful to avoid the
appearance of any evidence in the record that it intended to be liable on the policy.
On the other hand, in no case was evidence introduced by the injured plaintiff on this
point by testimony of either the government entity's or the carrier's agents who nego-
tiated the contract, although it would seem that such evidence would be admissible under
the "ambiguity" exception to the parole evidence rule. Moreover, there has never been
any attempt by the plaintiff to show, comparing the premium rates charged in the policy
in suit with those on policies involving no sovereign immunity, that the carriei con-
[Vol.1.959:589
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primary motivation is probably protection of government agents rather
than protection of the general public, although both ends may simul-
taneously be served. The insurance is envisaged as a type of fringe
employee benefit. Because most of the cases involving governmental
immunity arise out of motor vehicle accidents-nearly half of them
school buses-this rationale seems most plausible. Without additional
pressure, however, insurance is not likely to be purchased for other
than such limited activities.'8
An issue occasionally presenting itself in this area is whether or not
the purchase of insurance to protect against liability growing out of the
performance of immune functions is within the authority of government
officials. If not, there arises the further issue of the standing of the
carrier to plead this matter as a defense. While the government entity
or the taxpayers have such a privilege, it would seem proper to deny it
to the carrier on grounds of estoppel. Actually, however, estoppel has
seldom been mentioned by the courts, apparently because the carrier has
appeared only as counsel for the government entity. 9 As a result, the
tracted for liability. In several cases, the plaintiff alleged that the government entity
paid the same rates for its policy as did nonimmune insureds, but these cases never pro-
ceeded beyond the demurrer stage. See, e.g., Schulte v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
102 F. Supp. 681 (D. Minn. 195). In two cases, the carriers defended suits by
arguing that the premium rates paid by the government entity were lowered because of
its sovereign immunity. Burns v. American Cas. Co., 127 Cal. App.2d 198, 273 P.zd
605 (1954); Brooks v. Clark County, 279 Ky. 549, 18o S.W.2d 300 (944). It
should not be assumed that these were the only cases in which the argument could have
been advanced, however, for carriers have consistently won without this defense.
In practically no cases, then, with the exception of those involving an endorsement
on the policy by the carrier promising not to raise the defense (see note 62 infra), have
the courts had explicit evidence as to the intentions of the parties concerning the carrier's
liability. The courts have generally assumed that liability was intended, but have decided
the cases on the ground that the government entities have no power to waive their
sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, it is likely that a judicial suspicion that full liability
on the part of the carrier was not intended is a potent exculpating factor. If, however,
the courts should treat the sovereign immunity of the insured as obviating the require-
ment that the injured party obtain a judgment against the insured prior to bringing suit
against the carrier, carriers would be forced to be more explicit with respect to their
intent in this regard. See note 47 infra. Instead, the courts have, in effect, placed this
burden on the government entity by denying recovery on the insurance policy absent an
explicit provision by which the carrier promises not to raise the defense of immunity-
And even then, the courts have held this promise unenforceable. See note 63 infra.
8 These problems have received some attention elsewhere. See David, Tort Liability
of Local Government, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1, 45-52 (1959)5 James & Thornton, The
Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431 (1950) ;
Comments, 34 NEB. L. REv. 78 (iqs5); 54 MICH. L. REV. 404 (1956) ; 33 MINN. L.
REV. 634 (949).
" In one case where the carrier was sued in a direct action, the court ruled that it
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spectacle of the carrier pleading the illegality of its own contract on the
grounds of an alleged governmental disability, while still retaining the
premiums,20 has not disturbed judicial equanimity.
Adverting once more to the major issue, however, it is to be noted
that in most states statutes now authorize the purchase of liability
insurance covering specific immune governmental activities.2' But ab-
sent such authorization, the courts have held the purchase to be ultra
vires22 as well as a wasteful, unnecessary expenditure of public funds.2"
Of incidental interest in this connection are the cases where the govern-
ment sues the carrier for restitution of past premium payments after the
courts have barred an injured plaintiff from recovery on the policy
because its purchase was unauthorized. While earlier the carrier's
attorneys had argued that the contract was ultra vires, they now struggle
could not plead the government entity's lack of authority. McCaleb v. Continental Cas.
Co., 132 Tex. 65, 1x6 S.W.2d 679 (1938). However, with the exception of Thomas
v. Broadlands Community School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, xo9 N.E.zd 636 (1952),
where the defendant was the immune government entity, but the carrier was conducting
the defense, the courts have concluded that the defense can be raised. The fact that the
carrier and the insured have conflicting interests on this issue has not persuaded the
courts to upset the form of the action, which is theoretically against the government
entity.
20 Of course, carriers may, as a gesture of good faith, tender the premiums paid to
the court when they raise the lack-of-authority defense, but this is hardly satisfactory.
The essence of the insurance contract is that the carrier accepts a small fee for assuming
the unlikely risk of a large damage recovery. If carriers pay the small claims and
dodge the big suits on the lack-of-authority issue, while collecting regular premium
rates, the return of a handful of premiums is a small cost for what must be a lucrative
business. Nor does the return of premiums place all of the affected parties in staff quo
ante. Consider the parties whom the insurance was intended to benefit--the injured
and only partly compensated plaintiff and the tortfeasor-government agent who may be
forced to bear the burden alone. Because the cases are decided on the lack-of-authority
issue rather than on general principles of restitution, these factors may be legally irrele-
vant, but they are, nonetheless, highly important practically.
' See notes 27-43 infra.
"2 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wainscott, 41 Ariz. 439, 19 P.2d 328 (1933);
Burns v. American Cas. Co., 127 Cal. App.zd 298, 269 P.zd 656 (1954), aft'd on re-
hearing, 127 Cal. App.2d 198, 273 P.zd 605 (954) ; Adams v. City of New Haven,
131 Conn. 552, 41 A.2d 111 (1945) (dictum); Hummer v. School City of Hartford,
x22 N.E.zd 891 (Ind. App. 1953); Adkins v. Western & So. Indem. Co., 217 W. Va.
45r, 186 S.E. 302 (1936); Board of Educ. v. Commercial Cas. Co., 1x6 W. Va. 503,
18z S.E. 87 (1935). Contra, Rogers v. Butler, 27o Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 424
(1936).
2 There appears to be no question that a municipal government entity can insure
against liability for "proprietary" functions. The leading case is Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Village of Wadsworth, 2o9 Ohio St. 440, 142 N.E. 900 (1924). However, the reason-
ing upholding such a purchase is that the function might be endangered by tort suits
without the insurance. .
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to show that it was within the government entity's power so to spend
public money. Similarly, in cases where the government entity seeks to
recapture premiums paid on the ground that there has been a failure of
consideration owing to its immunity from tort liability, the carrier is
then at pains to show that something of value has been received. In
all of these cases, nevertheless, the courts have uniformly decreed resti-
tution.24
Quite apart from the cases where the policy insures the government
entity against tort liability is the situation where the "named insureds"
are government agents who ordinarily do not possess immune status.26
In these latter cases, the purchase of the insurance would appear to be
well within the authority of government officials. Thus, the purchase of
a policy insuring a school bus driver would seem to be an entirely appro-
priate and valid exercise of a school district's power to provide safe and
efficient transportation of school children. To protect these children
from the hazards of uncompensated injury arising from such transpor-
tation would appear to be as well indicated as procuring a fire-alarm
system for the school building. Further cogency is added by the
arguments that without such protection, competent and dependable
employees might not be easy to find, and that such insurance is necessary
for satisfactory labor-management relations2 6
The statutes authorizing the purchase of liability insurance for im-
mune government functions 7 have generally been directed at specific
"See Burns v. American Cas. Co., 127 Cal. App. i98, 269 P.zd 656 (954);
Adkins v. Western & So. Indem. Co., 117 W. Va. 451, 186 S.E. 302 (1936) 5 Board of
Educ. v. Commercial Cas. Co., ix6 W. Va. 503, 182 S.E. 87 (1935).
2' See note 38 infra.
"Only one case has been found in which these matters are discussed. Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co. v. Wainscott, 41 Ariz. 439, 19 P.2d 328 (1933). This decision is the
second earliest case discovered dealing with insurance and sovereign immunity from tort
liability.
" The following is a listing of the statutes enacted to date: ARK. STATS. § 66-517
(i947); CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 400 (1956) 5 GEN. STAT. CONN. REV. § 52-536
(1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2904 0953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.28 (1957);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-429, 32-431 (1952) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 41-33o4-o6 (Supp.
1957); IND. STAT. ANN. § 38-i8i9 (1952); IOWA CODE §§ 368A(12), 517A(i)
(1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 72-615 (Supp. 1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 471.42-
43 (Supp. 1958); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-1204 (Supp. -959); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ .8:5-50.4 (Supp. 1958); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-25-8, 9 (1953) 5 N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 16o-191.i (1952); N.D. REv. CODE §§ 15-4731, 39-0108 (Supp. 1953); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 307.44, 3327.09 (Baldwin 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 69, § 3o.16-
18, tit. 70 § 9.7 (Supp. -957); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 278.090, 332.180 (1953); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 7-774 (1950), tit. 71, § 63 4 (b) (Supp. 1958); S.D. LAWS,
C. 199 (1955)5 VT. LAwS No. 243
,
§ 5 (1949)5 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.284-.294
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problem areas, principally the much-litigated school bus accident situa-
tion."' Several of them go further, however, and authorize the insur-
ance of all state-owned motor vehicles. Although most of these
statutes are permissive only, in a growing number of states, liability
insurance is mandatory."0 Characteristically, the government agents,
either alone or together with the government entity, may be covered
by the insurance.31 While only a few statutes expressly waive the im-
munity of the government entity from suit,32 under a number of other
statutes, the insurer is specifically required to insert in the policy a
promise that he will not raise the immunity defense. 3
*Even where the purchase of liability insurance is authorized 4 or
(x95o); WASH. REV. CODE, § z8.58.xoo(xi) (195o); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 1774(7)
(Michie 1949)5 WIs. STAT. § 40.57 (1957); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 67-647
(Supp. 1957).
"Every statute listed in note 27 supra, covers the school bus problem, with the
exception of that of South Dakota. The following are states whose statutes authorize
only school bus insurance: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The
states listed in note 29 infra, which have statutes authorizing insurance for motor ve-
hicles owned by states, counties, or municipalities, include, of course, school buses.
" The following states authorize insurance for all state-owned motor vehicles: Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia. Some states have pressed further by
authorizing insurance for motor vehicles owned by municipal or county governments,
presumably when they are engaged in immune activities. These are Iowa, Minnesota,
North Carolina,'North Dakota, and Ohio. Statutes in two states, Arkansas and Okla-
homa, permit direct action against the insurer or insurance purchased by governmental
entities. This, by inference, would authorize the purchase of the insurance. See notes
44 and 45 infra.
" Statutes in the following states require that insurance be purchased: Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
" See the statutes of California, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.
2 Statutes expressly waive sovereign immunity from tort liability to the extent of the
insurance or contain language that should be so interpreted in Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, North Carolina, Virginia, Wyoming, and Wisconsin.
" Under some statutes, the carrier is simply required to make such a promise in the
policy. Under some statutes, the particular provision that the carrier must include in
the policy is specifically set forth. See, e.g., Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Minne-
sota, Montana, New Mexico, and North Dakota.
S' Courts may read a negative implication into the legislation and conclude that the
purchase of insurance is within the authority of the government entity only when it is
permitted by statute. Consider Hummer v. School City of Hartford, 112 N.E.2d 891
(Ind. App. 1953), where the court found no authority when a statute permitted insur-
ance on bus drivers, but the school district was the named insured on the policy. Op-
erating on the assumption that liability of the carrier was contracted for by the govern-
ment entity, the fact that the district rather than its agents was the named insured must
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where the issue of authority is not raised, 35 however, the injured plain-
tiff still faces the major problem of enforcing the contract. There are
three possible parties against whom the plaintiff may seek relief-the
government agent whose tortious conduct injured him, the government
entity, and the insurance carrier.
If the government agent is the named insured on the policy, either
alone or together with the government entity, a judgment against him
will be sufficient to render the carrier liable." Unless the jury can be
made aware of the existence of the insurance which will indemnify the
agent, however, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to obtain a judgment
which will adequately recompense him-if, indeed, he obtains one at all.
It is possible, moreover, that the government agent may be granted
immunity by statute r or judicial decision for acts within the scope of
his duties.3" While this is not common, where the situation exists, no
recovery at all is possible.
Ordinarily, an action against the carrier will be unsuccessful. It is
be considered a mistake caused by a failure on the part of the public officials to under-
stand the significance of the formal parties to the contract.
" Relative to the number of cases involving insurance and sovereign immunity, there
are few cases holding that there was no authority to obtain such insurance. Of these,
one half were decided prior to 1936. See note z supra.
" The courts have uniformly denied recovery against the government entity. Ayers
v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., xo6 F.2d 958 ( 5th Cir. 1939) ; Rittmiller v. School
Dist., 104 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 295z); Schulte v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co.,
102 F. Supp. 68x (D. Minn. 1951 ) ; Jones v. Scofield Bros., 73 F. Supp. 395 (D. Md.
1947) ; Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.zd 589 (Ky. App. 1952); Benton
v. Board of Educ., 201 N.C. 653, x61 S.E. 96 (1931).
"See, e.g., the act in Bailey v. City of Knoxville, 113 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Tenn.
1953).
"' In general, government agents are responsible for their own tortious conduct, even
when it occurs in the course of their duties. However, occasionally the doctrine of
sovereign immunity will be extended to a government agent on the rationale that the
suit is one against the government. The doctrinal picture is rather confused. The
courts purport to distinguish between acts which are "discretionary," or "quasi-judicial,"
in character, involving personal deliberation, judgment, and decision, and those which
are "ministerial," amounting only to obedience to orders. The mantle of sovereign
immunity has been drawn over the former, but not the latter. Further distinctions have
been drawn between "authorized" conduct and acts "in excess of authority," and be-
tween "nonfeasance" and "misfeasance." See, generally, HARPER & JtmES, ToRTs
§ 29.10 (1956) i PROSSER, ToRTs 780-84 (2d ed. z955); David, The Tort Liability of
Public Officers, iz So. CAL. L. REV. z6o, 368 (1939); Davis, Administrative Officers
Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. REv. 2o (x956); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administra-
tive Officers, 21 MINN. L. REa. 263 (1937) ; Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Admin-
istrative Officers, 27 FoRn. L. Ray. 530 (1943).
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universal practice for carriers to insert in the contract a provision such
as the following:"9
No action shall lie against the company until the amount of the damages for
which the assured is liable by reason of any casualty covered by this policy is
determined, either by final judgment against the assured, or by agreement
between the company and the person or corporation making the claim.
And courts, fearful of undue jury liberality in a negligence suit where
the carrier is joined as a defendant,40 have been careful to respect such
provisions. Nevertheless, this obstacle has been circumvented in some
states by the passage of a "direct action" statute which permits suit
directly against the carrier, despite the "no action" clause. Under such
a statute, the carrier's defense that the insured is immune is short-
circuited, as this defense is "personal" to the insured and not available
to the carrier.41 While such a statute may have some desirable social
effects, it is open to criticism on other grounds.42  Only one state,
Louisiana, is known to have such a statute applicable generally to lia-
bility insurance.43  However, a "direct action" statute applicable only
to insurance contracts with government entities immune from tort
liability would afford a dean-cut and generally equitable resolution, and
legislatures in the future may well adopt this approach. At present,
only Arkansas4" and Oklahoma 45 have enacted such a limited statute.
There remains the possibility that a direct suit against the carrier
might be permitted on the grounds that the insurance contract is for the
benefit of the injured third party plaintiff. The basic requirement-
that an intention be shown to confer primary benefit upon the public-
would not be difficult to satisfy. The existence of the sovereign im-
"This particular clause was used in the contract in Hughes v. Hartford Ace. &
Indem. Co., 223 Ala. 59, 134 So. 461 (1931).
"On the general subject of admissibility of evidence of insurance against liability,
see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 355-58 (1954) S Rapoport, Proper Discloseure During Triat
that Defendant is Insured, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 137 (1940). See also Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d
761 (1949).
"Rome v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 169 So. 132 (La. App. -936).
"'The basic difficulty with "direct action" statutes is that juries are assumed to be
excessively liberal in finding negligence and awarding high damage verdicts when the
carrier is a defendant. This is thought unfairly to increase premium rates.
"LA. REv. STAT. § 655 (195o). See Comment, x3 LA. L. REV. 495 (1953).
4"ARK. STAT. § 66-517 (1947). See Aetna Cas. Co. v. Brashears, 226 Ark. 1017,
297 S.W.zd 662 (1956), where the statute was held constitutional as applied to an
"indemnity" contract. See Jones, Direct A4ction Statutes and Jury Prejudice Against
Insurance Companies, zz ARK. L. REy. io (1956).
' OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 119 5 L (195). See Baker & Co. v. Lagaly, 144 F.ad 344.
(oth Cir. 1944).
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munity rebuts the usual presumption that liability insurance is intended
primarily to protect the insured, for here the government would be
amply protected without it. And if the purchase of liability- insurance
were statutorily required,46 this would even more persuasively manifest
an intention to protect the public.
To the degree that the intentions of the parties control, however,
the "no action" clause would seem sufficient to bar a direct suit against
the carrier, although it has been suggested that an indorsement on the
policy by which the carrier promises not to raise the defense of immu-
nity should be deemed to override the "no action" clause. And in the
handful of cases in which this third party beneficiary theory has been
advanced by counsel, the courts have so far uniformly rejected it.48
Looking to the supposed intentions of the parties, these decisions are
understandable-for it is hard to see how the promise not to raise the
immunity defense is inconsistent with the requirement of a judgment
against the insured prior to suit against the carrier. And as a matter of
policy, too, these rulings are supportable, provided that these courts do
not also foreclose maintenance of an action against the insured govern-
ment entity. To block both avenues of recovery would be indefensible.
Perhaps the most direct approach to the problem would be to modify
the doctrine of sovereign immunity by carving out an exception where a
" Where insurance is required by statute to cover specific activities, some policies in
the past have been construed to be for the benefit of third parties-the public-and
claimants have been permitted to bring suit directly against the carrier. Malachowski
v. Varro, 76 Cal. App. .07, 244 Pac. 936 (1926) 5 Great Amer. Indem. Co. v. Vickers,
183 Ga. 233, ISS S.E. 24 (1936). These cases involved liability insurance on public
carriers required by statute, and in both, the courts were faced with policies containing
Ccno action" clauses. Liability insurance is now required of car owners in many states
under financial responsibility laws, and yet direct actions against the carriers without first
obtaining judgment against the insured are not permitted.
"' It would seem that a better logical argument could be made where there is no such
promise by the carrier, for then the sovereign immunity doctrine, read as part of the
contract, would be inconsistent with the requirement of a prior judgment against the
insured. If the court has previously determined that suits against the insured cannot
be maintained, the prior judgment requirement should be dispensed with and a direct
action suit against the carrier would be a proper solution. So far, no claimant in such
circumstances has been known to have chosen this route. The addition of the endorse-
ment derogates from this line of reasoning in that, with it, a suit against the insured
government entity should be successful. While it is true that courts have so far denied
recovery against the insured, despite the carrier's promise to waive immunity, see note
63 infra, at least the courts cannot assume that in a later suit against the government
entity, the carrier will violate its promise. See Schulte v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
1oz F. Supp. 68x (D. Minn. 1951).
"s Ford v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 80 F. Supp. 347 (E.D.S.C. 1948); Hughes v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 223 Ala. 59, 134 So. 461 (193).
VOL. 1959: 588]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
government entity has purchased liability insurance. The courts have
seldom been asked to do this, and when asked, they have always denied
the request. In as much as the existence of insurance is, by traditional
jurisprudential thinking, not to be considered as an operative fact in
determining liability, the courts have understandably balked at creating
an exception on such a ground.4' But the courts have seldom explained
their refusal on this basis; instead, they have usually taken refuge in
the position that only the legislature has the power to change the law.
An alternative approach is the one almost universally debated in
these cases-viz., by purchasing insurance, the government entity has
waived its immunity and impliedly consented to be sued for the purpose
of determining the liability of the carrier. Because the carrier is con-
ducting the defense, no evidence of an express waiver by the govern-
ment entity appears in these cases. The waiver is rather construed as
follows: the purchase of insurance indicates an intention by the govern-
ment entity that the carrier be liable; since the contractual complement
necessary to achieve this is liability of the government entity, at least a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity must have been intended. It
thus becomes clear why so few cases involving municipal government
entities have been litigated. Because such entities are liable for some
of their activities, the courts have, where possible, indulged in the pre-
sumption that the insurance was intended to cover nonimmune activi-
ties; and, therefore, the waiver theory has been rejected.
The greatest obstacle to the effectiveness of the theory of waiver by
the government entity is the notion that the power to waive immunity
'" The problem at a deeper level may reflect a jurisprudential bias by courts against
allowing themselves to be influenced by the existence of insurance. Our law has always
prided itself on equality of treatment of rich and poor alike. In much of our legal his-
tory, this may have meant that the rich man is to be protected by law from worse treat-
ment than that received by the poor man. Most courts have probably been scrupulous
in refusing to allow the ability of the defendant to pay a judgment affect the determina-
tion of liability or the amount of damages. Certainly the formal doctrines of law and
their rationales do not admit the relevance of such a factor as the ability to pay. But
the underlying reasons for many legal doctrines are often heavily weighted by such
factors as whether or not the defendant can bear the initial judgment, whether or not he
can shift this loss in whole or in part to others, and who bears the ultimate risk, rather
than the ornate and pious "legal" justifications for such doctrines. When the underlying
factors are significantly altered, and in certain areas of tort law, modern commercial
development of liability insurance has accomplished this, it is unfortunate that the judges
have failed to realize that the reasons for the traditional rules have changed and thatjustice now requires modification of these rules. Few examples of anachronistic doctrine
can be found which are more striking than the sovereign immunity doctrine.
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resides exclusively in the legislature.50 It is upon this rock that nearly
every attempt to enforce the insurance policy by suit against the insured
government entity has foundered." It is not dear how or why this
attitude took such firm root, or how or why sovereign immunity came to
be regarded as anything other than a legal advantage susceptible of
being modified contractually. The courts do not even bother to discuss
the matter. Perhaps part of the answer lies in the scandalous history of
local government graft and corruption of half a century ago. Still, it
is difficult to visualize any modem policy considerations served by the
rigid sovereign immunity doctrine that would not be equally protected
by permitting a waiver through the purchase of liability insurance.
Because of the seemingly adamant requirement of positive legisla-
tive action, it has been argued that a legislative waiver may be adduced
from statutes which authorize a government entity to purchase liability
insurance covering an immune activity. It has been urged that the
statute would otherwise be rendered nugatory. Although this argument
would lose some of its force if the statute merely authorized the in-
surance of government agents,52 it is manifestly absurd for the courts to
" The traditional statement of this rationale is, "There is no provision of law for
raising the funds with which to pay a claim not authorized or recognized by law."
Boone v. Columbus, 87 Ga. App. 701, 75 S.E.zd 338 (1953). This boils down to
nothing more than the proposition that taxes cannot be raised for illegal expenditures,
and such an expenditure is illegal. Thus, there are no legally available funds with
which to "waive" the immunity. In as much as it assumes its own conclusion, this
approach is hardly a convincing reason for denying the power of government entities
to waive their sovereign immunity.
5 Holland v. Western Airlines, Inc., 54. F. Supp. 457 (D. Mont. 1957); Ritt-
miller v. School Dist., ion- F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1952) Jones v. Scofield Bros.,
73 F. Supp. 395 (D. Md. 1947)5 Boone v. Columbus, 87 Ga. App. 701, 75 S.E.zd
338 (1953); Ford v. Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 P.2d 589 (z958)5 Hummer v.
School City of Hartford, 1i2 N.E.2d 891 (Ind. App. 1953); Stucker v. Musca-
tine County, 87 N.W.2d 452 (Iowa 1958) ; Taylor v. Nevada, 311 P.zd 733 (Nev.
1957) ; Cushman v. County of Grafton, 97 N.H. 32, 79 A.zd 63o (1951); Livingston
v. Regents of New Mexico College, 328 P.2d 78 (N.M. 1958); Marmor v. Port of
New York Authority, 203 Misc. 568, 116 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Benton v.
Board of Educ., 201 N. C. 653, 161 S.E. 96 (1931); Kesman v. Fallowfield Township,
345 Pa. 457, 29 A.2d 17 (1942); Boice v. Board of Educ., xii W. Va. 95, i6o S.E.
566 (1931); Price v. State Highway Commn, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (-946).
12 Although the thought was not expressed in the opinions, Rittmiller v. School
Dist., 1o4 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1952), Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245
S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1952), can be distinguished from other cases in note 51 supra
on this basis. It might appear that since in either situation the insurance premium is
paid with public funds, no different legislative intent should be found where the statute
permits the government agents to be insured, even if it is relevant logically. However,
premiums for insurance covering government agents might be cheaper.
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deny enforcement of the insurance policy where the statute authorizes
the government entity to procure insurance for itself only. While
most courts to which this argument has been addressed have recognized
its cogency, they have, nevertheless, with few exceptions, rejected it. 3
Their rationale has been that a waiver by statute must be clear and
express, rather than implied. Thus, although the legislatures have not
been too helpful in providing a solution to the problem, a share of the
responsibility must be borne by the judiciary.54
Some practical difficulties, however, have been pointed out in justi-
fication of this seemingly doctrinaire judicial position.55 It has been
suggested that problems would arise as to whether the government
entity would be liable where a judgment exceeded the limits of the
policy, 0 or where the policy was not in force owing to such reasons as
"Rittmiller v. School Dist., 104 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1952); Hummer v.
School City of Hartford, h12 N.E.zd 891 (Ind. App. 1953)5 Chambers v. Ideal Pure
Milk Co., 24,5 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 195z); Michael v. School Dist. of Lancaster,
391 Pa. 209, 137 A.2d 456 (1958); Utz v. Board of Educ., 126 W. Va. 823, 30
S.E2zd 342 (1944). Contra, Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 292 Ky. 767,
167 S.W.2d 700 (1942). Two cases which discuss this issue are easily distinguished
because there was no insurance in litigation. Thomas v. Board of Educ. i s N.J. 2o7,
94 A.zd 206 (1953); Texas Prison Bd. v. Cabeen, 159 S.W.zd 523 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942).
" This restrictive interpretation of the statutes follows the pattern of judicial ob-
struction in this field. Perhaps one-third of the states have at one time passed statutes
permitting claims to be brought against the state and defining the procedure for the
courts to follow. The courts, however, have uniformly refused to interpret such legis-
lation as a waiver of immunity. Various rationales have been employed. One has been
that the statutes contemplate only those claims for which relief was previously available
-contract claims only. Another approach has been that "claims" are not "causes of
action" and that although the statute permits the filing of suits against the state, it does
not permit the recovery of damages. One commentator has summarized these decisions
as granting a statutory permission "to visit the courthouse," Leflar & Kantrowitz supra
note 3 5 and another has questioned whether the legislature merely intended to permit
claimants to file suit to "amuse themselves." Note, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 340, 343 (1920).
Another situation where the courts have narrowly construed legislative consent statutes
is where an act creating a special government entity provides that the organization shall
be authorized "to sue and be sued." While it is true that the language chosen by the
legislatures has often not been unequivocal in waiving tort immunity, the evidence is
also clear that the courts have been zealous in shielding the sovereign immunity doc-
trine. See Nutting, supra note 3, at 5-7.
"See the opinion of Judge Chestnut, in Jones v. Scofield Bros., 73 F. Supp. 393
(D. Md. 2947).
5 This objection does not appear to be serious for in states where recovery against-
the insurance proceeds is allowed, the trial judges have limited the judgment to execu-
tion against the insurance policy. See McCloud v. City of LaFollette, 38 Tenn. App.
553, 276 S.W.2d 763 (1954). See also, Thomas v. Broadlands Community School
Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 1o9 N.E.2d 636 (x95.).
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failure to present the claim within the time required by the policy,57 or
where the carrier was insolvent. These supposed difficulties are, how-
ever, merely the result of conceiving the claimed waiver as a unitary
idea; to limit the waiver to the extent of the available insurance pro-
ceeds would better accord with the probable real intention of the con-
tracting government entity.58 If a waiver by the government entity were
permitted, there would appear to be nothing inappropriate in allowing
this intention to govern its extent. If the waiver were deemed to be
accomplished by the legislature, a similar limited intention should not
be difficult to presume.59
Even absent a clear and unambiguous statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity, however, the courts of a few states have permitted recovery
of a tort judgment against an insured, but otherwise immune, govern-
ment entity.60 The most significant approach to the problem is that of
" Such problems do not seem insurmountable. In Rogers v. Butler, 17o Tenn. iz5,
92 S.W.zd 414 (1936), the trial court permitted the plaintiff to recover a judgment
against the insured board of education. The carrier declined to defend the suit, be-
cause notice of the claim was not submitted seasonably. The Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee upheld the decision that the purchase of the policy "waived" the board's sovereign
immunity, but modified the judgment so as to make it apply only to insurance proceeds.
See also Tracy v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 16o (E.D. 11. 1954). In Utz v. Board of
Educ., 1z6 W. Va. 823, 30 S.E.zd 342 (194€), in which the court held that the mere
purchase of liability insurance did not waive sovereign immunity where the policy was
inoperative owing to a mistake in reporting the accident to the carrier. While both
this case and Rogers v. Butler, supra, may bring about the same result-the plaintiff
recovers nothing except as against the government agent-one can see that it is not
necessary to employ the rationale of the Utz case.
"8 The so-called "municipal endorsement," see note 6z infra, which is featured in
many of the recent cases, typically provides that the policy will not be in force if the
claim exceeds a stated limit. This should be a sufficient showing of the limited inten-
tions of the government entity.
"A number of the statutes which authorize the purchase of insurance, provide that
the government entity is not to be liable in excess of the policy limits. See note 32
supra.
60 Note the development of the law in two jurisdictions, Kentucky and Tennessee,
which adhere to the "waiver" doctrine. In Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Educ.,
292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W.zd 700 (1942), the court purported to be influenced by a statute
showing a legislative intention to waive the immunity. In the later case of Standard
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1947), while
the court relied on the Taylor case, it adopted the broad "waiver."
A similar development is to be noted in Tennessee. After finding statutory authority
to purchase insurance in a provision permitting the board of education to require a
bond of its bus drivers, the court found a "waiver" of the immunity. Rogers v. Butler,
17o Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 44 (x935). See also City of Kingsport v. Lane, 35 Tenn.
App. 183, 243 S.W.2d 289 (x95i); Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn. App.
274, 222 S.W.2d 607 (1949)5 Taylor v. Cobble, 28 Tenn. App. 167, 187 S.W.zd
648 (1945). In Bailey v. City of Knoxville, 113 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1953),
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the Illinois courts, involving a substantive modification of the immunity
concept itself. The formulation of this position is that sovereign im-
munity exists only for the protection of public funds, and its essence is
the absence of a duty to pay an adverse judgment from public funds.
Accordingly there need be no immunity from suit, as the immunity
properly applies only to the execution of judgment."' This approach
not only comprehends the underlying reason for the sovereign im-
munity doctrine and shapes the defense according to that meaning, but
also effectively evades the legal and logical pitfalls of the waiver argu-
ment-the lack of power of the government entity to waive, the prob-
lems of judgments in excess of the policy limits, the nonoccurrence of
conditions precedent, and the carrier's insolvency.
In addition to the other contentions advanced by injured plaintiffs
seeking-to recover on the insurance policy, one argument has stemmed
from the fact that in some cases, there has been an endorsement on the
policy to the effect that the carrier will not raise the defense of sover-
eign immunity."' This undertaking is plainly inconsistent with the
aff'd, 222 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1955), "waiver" by the government entity was found
despite a statute providing immunity for the function. In McCloud v. City of La-
Follette, 38 Tenn. App. 353, 276 S.W.2d 763 (1954), the court rejected the conten-
tion that recovery against the insurance proceeds was based on the use of "municipal
endorsements' see note 62 infra, which were found in the litigated policies in Rogers
v. Butler, supra, and City of Kingsport v. Lane, supra.
"
1This was .accomplished in two stages. In Thomas v. Broadlands Community
School Dist., 348 Ill. App. 567, 5o9 N.E.2d 636 (x95z)j the court permitted the plain-
tiff to recover a judgment against the school district to the extent of the insurance
proceeds. While this is an excellently written opinion, the court is not explicit about
the theory of the case. It expressly refused to decide the issue of the power of the
government entity to waive its sovereign immunity, and it is arguable that its method
was to create an,. exception when insurance existed. However, in the subsequent case of
Tracy v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 16o (E.D. Ill. 1954), the court denied a motion for
demurrer in a suit against an immune government entity when the existence of insurance
was not pleaded. The court interpreted Thomas v. Broadlands Community School
Dist., supra, as holding that sovereign immunity did not bar the suit, only execution
of a judgment and thus the existence of insurance was immaterial. It is to be expected
that plaintiffs will not needlessly harass government entities by obtaining unenforceable
judgments against them, but will only bestir themselves when there is an insurance fund
to reach. Unfortunately, Tracy v. Davis, supra, is almost never cited, the theory of
Thomas v. Broadlands Community School Dist., supra, has not been understood when
it has been cited, and, as a result, perhaps, the Illinois approach has not had the in-
fluence it properly deserves. It is interesting to note that both of these Illinois cases
were deeply influenced by the Illinois case of Moore v. Moyle, 405 IIl. 555, 92 N.E.2d
81 (595o), which is perhaps the lest reasoned of the cases where recovery was permitted
against an immune, but insured, charitable institution.
"A sample form of this so-called "municipal endorsement" is as follows: "It is
agreed that the Company will not, when so requested by the Insured in writing, main-
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limitation on the carrier's promise to pay to the extent of "liability
imposed by law on the insured." In the few cases in which the carrier's
counsel, representing the insured government entity, has violated its
agreement by urging this defense, however, the courts have permitted
it, reasoning that the promise was made to and could be enforced by
the insured only and not the plaintiff as a member of the public.6
Moreover, in these circumstances, the courts have held that the carrier,
in defending the government entity, is not estopped from raising the
defense and that this is not inconsistent with public policy. Where a
statute forbids the carrier to raise this defense, however, no case has
held that it may, not withstanding."' On the other hand, no case as yet
has unequivocally held the defense unavailable.
CONCLUSIONS
In general, the cases in this area demonstrate a high degree of judi-
cial resistance to any modification of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
Because the existence of insurance presents the courts with such an ex-
cellent opportunity to mitigate the unfortunate results of the doctrine,
these cases testify to an underlying lack of sympathy with the notion
that the risks of governmentally inflicted injuries to private citizeris
should be borne by society. The highly restrictive construction of
ameliorative legislation further evidences this same attitude. The fact
that most statutes are permissive rather than mandatory, however, in-
dicates that the legislatures, too, are not totally committed to shifting
tain that the Insured is immune from liability by reason of having been engaged in a
governmental, eleemosynary, or other function exempting it from liability as a matter
of law." This particular form appeared in the policy in Schulte v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., 1o2 F. Supp. 68x (D. Minn. 195,).
"1 Jones v. Scofield Bros., 73 F. Supp. 395 (D. Md. 19,t7) i Arnold v. Walton, 205
Ga. 6o6, 54 S.E.2d 424. (1949)5 Hummer v. School City of Hartford, 112 N.E.zd 891
(Ind. App. 1953) ; Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.zd 195 (1950);
Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W.zd 736 (194.7). Cf., Standard
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 72 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1947) ; Taylor
v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W.2d 7oo (1942); City of Kings-
port v. Lane, 35 Tenn. App. 183, 243 S.W.2d 289 (1951).
"4 The case of Hummer v. School City of Hartford, supra note 63, so held, but the
case is distinguishable. See note 34 supra. In two other cases, the courts refused to
permit the plaintiff to recover despite such a statute. In each case, the court held that
the statute did not apply, as the insurance was purchased before the act took effect. Both
courts refused to be influenced by the policy import of the inapplicable statute, as they
decided that the government entities possessed no power to waive sovereign immunity
by purchasing insurance. Holland v. Western Airlines, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 457 (D.
Mont. 1957); Ford v. Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 P.2d 589 (1958).
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the risk of such injuries to taxpayers. The effect of these statutes, then,
is to pass the policy choice on this issue back to the local government
entities.
To the extent that state court judges recognize the injustices occa-
sioned by the sovereign immunity doctrine, their refusal to modify it
manifests a bias against creative activity by the judiciary in bringing an
outmoded doctrine into accord with modern conditions and conceptions
of justice. For judges to refuse to allow a recovery on an insurance
policy as intended by the contracting government entity and the legis-
lature and to take refuge in the sovereign immunity doctrine, when its
only raison d'gtre-protection of public funds-is satisfied, pushes the
rule beyond the logical limits of its principle. Judicial resistance to the
movement in this area of law from the status of immunity to a norm of
contract through insurance, points to the need for more affirmative and
systematic state legislation.
Despite the fact that the courts have refused to permit an insurance
recovery in the great majority of cases, the prospect is not unrelievedly
gloomy. It is by no means impossible for government entities to obtain
enforceable insurance. The purchase of liability insurance protecting
government agents would seem to be within the authority of govern-
ment entities, even in the absence of an enabling statute. Because its
agents do not ordinarily share the government's immunity, legal stum-
bling blocks such as lack of power to waive the immunity are avoided.
It is true that the extent of protection thus afforded the public is prob-
ably less than if the insurance were enforceable against the government
entity, for absent a wealthy defendant, juries may be expected to be
slower to find liability and to be less liberal with damage verdicts. How-
ever, even such protection as this is an improvement over no recovery
at all.
There is one further possibility. Although courts have steadily de-
nied the enforceability of liability insurance contracts covering immune
governmental activities, all indications point to its increasing popularity.
This suggests that at least some carriers and government entities may be
entering into arrangements under which the carrier will assume liability
and settle claims, but only for an amount which is, in its opinion, "just"
compensation. If the facts of the claim are weak with regard to culpa-
bility or the damages asked are exorbitant, the carrier, perhaps with the
permission of the government entities, may refuse to pay the claim and
raise the sovereign immunity defense. In return for this advantage,
perhaps the carrier may charge a lower rate. Settlement with claimants
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on such a take-it-or-leave-it basis would be efficient and economical. If
such a practice exists to any large extent, it would be an interesting busi-
ness solution to a vexing problem.
Despite the risk that the carrier may be arbitrary in its determination
of responsibility for the injury or a reasonable amount of damages, the
process suggested has commendable features. Because the injured party
will never be permitted a jury verdict, the insurance premium rates
should be lower than otherwise might be possible, and government
entities should be more inclined to purchase such insurance. Only a
few of the statutes authorizing the purchase of liability insurance have
made it mandatory. Although legislative abandonment of sovereign
immunity would be the most desirable solution to the problem, until
this can be accomplished, this process presents an interim solution worthy
of further investigation and consideration. At any rate, it is better than
a vigorously-asserted sovereign immunity doctrine with its attendant
low volume of insurance protection. If a greater degree of insurance
protection is desired by government entities, the alternative would be to
purchase a policy insuring nonimmune government agents.
Whether the sanctioning of liability insurance covering immune
governmental activities will tend to retard progress toward a more
general assumption of liability by government, or act as a catalyst and
accelerate the progress, is a question not easily answered. Undoubtedly,
the effectiveness of liability insurance in providing protection for both
government agents and the public in the motor vehicle accident situa-
tion to some extent disarms the advocates of reform legislation. On
the other hand, the added business may whet the appetite of the in-
surance industry to the point of inducing it to apply pressure in the
legislature in behalf of statutes authorizing increased governmental
assumption of tort liability.
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